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INTRODUCTION 
A bridge stretching only three-quarters of the distance across a 
chasm is useless, while a bridge that is longer than necessary does no 
more good than one that just spans the gap.  This standard, intuitive 
example of a lumpy, indivisible, or “step” good makes regular appear-
ances in the literature on collective action.1  But it also illustrates a 
point about discontinuities and complementarities that has broad, and 
mostly unexplored, significance for property law.2  From land assem-
blies to takings doctrines to cotenant partitions to public housing to 
the numerus clausus principle, we see property delivering value—and 
being delivered to us—in certain identifiable, discontinuous chunks.  
This Article examines the implications of lumpiness for property theory 
and doctrine.  While strains of this conceptual element run through 
some of the existing theoretical work on property,3 the ways in which 
lumpiness may explain, justify, and challenge features of property law 
have not been systematically analyzed. 
Viewing property through the lens of lumpiness matters for at least 
three reasons.  The first is descriptive accuracy.  Property law is lumpy 
as a positive matter, filled with doctrines and approaches that deal with 
 
1 See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 59 (1982) (observing that the 
bridge is a “standard example[]” of a “single-step good[],” but qualifying this example 
by noting the wide spectrum of possible bridge types). 
2 This Article focuses exclusively on real and personal property.  It does not engage 
the interesting complementarities and discontinuities that arise in intellectual property, 
or the scholarly literature surrounding them.  See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 162-69 (2011) (using “the parable of the bridge” to illustrate 
proportionality and leverage in intellectual property).  Lumpiness has implications for 
other areas of law as well.  For a brief overview, see Lee Anne Fennell, Slices and Lumps 
(Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 395), available at http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1106421. 
3 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
69, 76-79 (2005) (positing that less costly ways of delineating property rights produce 
lumpy, asymmetric entitlements).  Lumpiness also relates closely to the literatures on 
economies of scale and land assembly problems, where larger holdings may be dispro-
portionately more valuable than the sum of smaller holdings.  See Robert C. Ellickson, 
Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1332-35 (1993) (discussing situations in which “re-
turns increase with parcel size”); see also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticom-
mons:  Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 659 (1998) 
(addressing problems in assembling property entitlements into useful bundles). 
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the world in discrete, hard-to-divide chunks.  Understanding how 
property operates thus requires an appreciation of its lumpiness.  Se-
cond, optimal property design requires evaluating the chunkiness that 
is built into property doctrines and asking whether and how it corre-
sponds to underlying discontinuities in the production or consump-
tion of property.  Third, many of property law’s most important 
conflicts can be usefully framed as “lump versus lump.”  For example, 
an exercise of eminent domain may achieve a valuable spatial aggrega-
tion by splitting up some other aggregation, such as lengthy temporal 
attachments to the land or a cohesive community that shares social 
capital.4  Recognizing the significance of nonlinearities in such stories 
can offer new traction on contemporary property debates.  
The analysis here proceeds in four parts.  Part I explains how and 
why we might regard property as lumpy.  Part II examines how ideas 
connected to lumpiness enter into property law, whether as rationales 
for legal intervention, justifications for doctrinal protections, or bases 
for judicial or administrative outcomes.  Part III turns to property 
theory, where notions of lumpiness map onto current debates over the 
bundle-of-rights metaphor and over the relationship between exclu-
sion and social obligation.  This discussion also raises questions about 
the mutability and social contingency of property’s lumpy nature.  Part 
IV offers some analytic lessons that property scholars can take away 
from a study of lumpiness. 
I.  HOW AND WHY IS PROPERTY LUMPY? 
Property entitlements that encompass strongly complementary ele-
ments may be said to have a lumpy or indivisible quality.  To take a sim-
ple example, a dwelling’s four walls, roof, and foundation are generally 
viewed as strongly complementary:  removing any one element changes 
a fully contained private shelter into a windbreak, a cubicle, or a lean-to.  
Just as the last segment of a bridge delivers a disproportionate amount 
of utility, so too will a dwelling’s last wall.  Similar claims might implicitly 
underpin a variety of legal doctrines and interventions, including mini-
mum standards for the quality and size of housing, minimum tenure 
lengths, minimum bundles of property rights, and the use of eminent  
 
 
4 See infra notes 65-67 & 142 and accompanying text. 
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domain to assemble land into larger chunks.  Before we can analyze 
these and other examples, however, we first need to lay some defini-
tional and taxonomic groundwork. 
A.  What’s Lumpy? 
As Michael Taylor and Hugh Ward observe, some goods “cannot 
be usefully provided in any amounts but only in more or less massive 
‘lumps.’”5  A good is lumpy (in one sense) if it provides benefits only 
when a particular quantity threshold is reached, rather than delivering 
utility in smoothly scalable units as quantities increase.6  More broadly, 
the notion of lumpiness is associated with various kinds of discontinui-
ties, indivisibilities, nonlinearities, and complementarities.  
1.  Steps and Lumps 
Lumpiness is a matter of degree.  At the extreme, a good might 
take a “step” form, like the prototypical bridge shown in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1:  The Bridge 
Value 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  
Number of Segments Assembled 
 
 
5 Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods:  Alternative Models 
of Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350, 353 (1982).   
6 See, e.g., id. at 353-54 (using bridges and rail projects as examples of goods that 
exhibit such discontinuities); see also Jean Hampton, Free-Rider Problems in the Production 
of Collective Goods, 3 ECON. & PHIL. 245, 248-50 (1987) (contrasting “pure step goods” 
such as bridges, which require “one big production step,” with goods that can be pro-
duced in smaller increments).  Another sort of lumpiness stems from production limi-
tations rather than consumption utility, as where a product can only be supplied 
profitably in a particular size or quantity.  See infra subsection I.A.2. 
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As Figure 1 shows, the structure is worthless until all the segments  
required to span the gap are in place, and it becomes no more valua-
ble as superfluous segments are added.7 
Such pure step goods are rare.8  But equally rare are perfectly linear 
goods—those with a smooth, continuous production function in which 
each infinitesimally fine unit of input is matched by a similar adjust-
ment in output or utility.  Between these two extremes, we find differ-
ent degrees of nonlinearity or indivisibility.9   
I will use the term “lumpiness” broadly here to refer to severe dis-
continuities or nonlinearities in the production function, whether or 
not those functions take a pure step form or intersperse sharply in-
creasing or decreasing returns with ranges exhibiting linearity.10  These 
differences in shape are important, however, because they can influ-
ence the prospects for cooperation and the risks of strategic behavior.11   
Figure 2 shows another example of a (relatively) lumpy good.  
Although this good does not deliver all its value in a single shot, its 
production function contains ranges over which the marginal effect of 
added segments is sharply increasing or decreasing.   
 
7 See, e.g., Hampton, supra note 6, at 248-49 & 248 fig.2 (defining and depicting 
pure step goods). 
8 See HARDIN, supra note 1, at 59 (observing that even the standard example of a 
bridge does not really qualify as a step good, given that bridges may be supplied at a 
wide variety of price and quality levels).   
9 See, e.g., Hampton, supra note 6, at 249-50 (discussing “steppy” collective goods, 
for which contributions in particular increments will add value, and “mixed structure” 
collective goods, which may require an initially large production step but could then be 
improved in smaller increments).   
10 Definitions vary.  Compare id. at 248-50 (equating “lumpy goods” with “pure step 
goods” and distinguishing both from hybrid forms like multi-step and mixed goods), 
with MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE 57-58 (1988) (recognizing the possibility 
of “lumpy goods with sloping risers” that exhibit linearity “after the initial production 
threshold is crossed”).  
11 See Pamela Oliver et al., A Theory of the Critical Mass (pt. I):  Interdependence, Group 
Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action, 91 AM. J. SOC. 522, 525-28 (1985) (exam-
ining the relationship between production-function shapes and the prospects for collec-
tive action); Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 971-78 
(2004) (exploring this point in the context of land use and resource entitlements). 
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Figure 2:  The S-Curve 
Value 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Number of Segments Assembled 
 
The S-curve shown in Figure 2 matches up with many collective 
goods that require a critical mass of participation to succeed, but that at 
some point plateau.12  It might also fit with certain kinds of land as-
sembly projects, where value increases sharply once a certain number 
of parcels are aggregated, but where having all the parcels is not essen-
tial.13   
Of course, nonlinearities might take many other forms; Figure 1 
and Figure 2 offer just two examples. 
2.  What’s in the Lump? 
So far, I have spoken of “segments” that produce value when ag-
gregated together.  As this formulation suggests, lumpiness or indivisi-
bility often refers to quantities of relatively fungible inputs—pieces of a 
bridge, lengths of railroad track, tires for a car, units of work, years of 
housing tenure, and so on.  Yet it may also refer to organic systems 
made up of heterogeneous elements, such as a machine that cannot 
operate without each and every one of its parts.14  In the context of 
land assembly, the unique spatial location of each parcel may make the 
component parts of the desired assembly nonfungible.  What matters 
 
12 See Oliver et al., supra note 11, at 527-28, 527 fig.1(a) (presenting and discussing 
an S-shaped “general third-order” production function). 
13 For graphical representations and analyses of possible land assembly scenarios, 
see, for example, John F. McDonald, What Is Public Use?  Eminent Domain and the Kelo 
Decision, 5 CORNELL REAL EST. REV. 10, 15-19 (2007), and Lee Anne Fennell, Taking 
Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 972-75. 
14 See ARNOLD M. FADEN, ECONOMICS OF TIME AND SPACE 208, 213 (1977).   
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most to the shape of a given assembly problem is not whether the 
components are interchangeable with each other, but rather whether 
close substitutes exist for each of the components required for a given 
assembly.15  Thus, both homogenous and heterogeneous aggregations 
fit within the broad conception of lumpiness pursued here. 
It is also worth emphasizing that the components in question may 
be temporal in nature.  Some goods, such as private residences, are 
often viewed as disproportionately valuable when consumed in 
lengthy, unbroken temporal chunks.  Often, these valuable temporal 
chunks are defined by reference to external events, such as the length 
of a life, a job, or an educational program.  Property intentionally 
bundles along the temporal dimension and, at least in the case of the 
fee simple absolute, it does so in a very open-ended way. 
B.  Lumpy Demand, Lumpy Supply, and the Law 
A good may exhibit lumpiness either because it is considerably less 
valuable when divided or because it is very expensive to divide (or to 
produce in smaller units in the first instance).  The loss in consump-
tion utility associated with dividing a lumpy good corresponds to lumpi-
ness in demand, while the increase in production cost associated with 
making goods in particular quantities or configurations corresponds 
to lumpiness in supply.  Lumpiness becomes noticeable and relevant 
when there is a mismatch between the units that users demand and 
the units that producers supply. 
Consider first lumpy demand.  Most people have two feet of similar 
size and follow the social custom of shodding them identically; thus, 
they buy shoes in lumps of two.  Likewise, the users of bridges drive 
vehicles that are sensitive to gravity; consequently, they demand com-
plete rather than partial bridges.  In these cases and many others, the 
indivisibility relates to consumption utility, not to production pro-
cesses that compel the provision of goods in particular chunks.16  The 
 
15 Thus, even though a car may require many different mechanical parts to run 
(none of which could substitute for another), there will be no difficulty assembling the 
necessary pieces so long as each part is readily available on the open market.  Conversely, 
even if a group is building a bridge out of identical, interchangeable segments, there 
may still be an assembly problem if there are no outside sources of bridge material and 
each individual in the group holds a segment essential to the whole. 
16 Indivisibility in production might also be present, however, to the extent that 
these goods require design or assembly work that is more cheaply provided in a lump.   
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lumpiness shows up in the demand curve, with little or no demand for 
quantities of the good below the critical threshold.17 
In other instances, lumpiness stems not from consumption utility, 
but rather from the costs or technological limits of production.  For 
example, the fixed costs associated with certain kinds of factory up-
grades or expansions may make them affordable only in chunks of cer-
tain sizes.18  Lumpiness in supply can also manifest itself in limited 
menus of products, where each variety requires a fixed minimum out-
lay.19  Consider, for example, Henry Ford’s decision to offer Model T 
purchasers “a car painted any colour that he wants so long as it is 
black.”20  Here, the lumpiness is a function of the indivisible cost of 
setting up a particular production run. 
Finally, law often introduces indivisibilities.  In the property con-
text, the numerus clausus principle has the effect of producing a lim-
ited, and hence lumpy, menu.  Other aspects of property law keep 
certain interests from being split up, or require that they be split only 
in particular ways.  Legally imposed lumps push the inquiry back to 
the question of whether there are underlying discontinuities that ex-
plain why certain combinations of entitlements must be consumed or 
produced together, or not at all.21 
C.  Property Lumps 
With the idea of lumpiness more clearly in mind, we can consider 
the ways in which property might be understood as lumpy.  To start, 
property can be described as a lumpy institution to the extent that its 
defining features are associated with discontinuities or indivisibilities—
and, indeed, to the extent it is understood as having a set of defining 
 
17 See generally Stephen Shmanske & Daniel Packey, Lumpy Demand and the Diagram-
matics of Aggregation, 30 J. ECON. EDUC. 64 (1999).   
18 See, e.g., William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pig in the Python:  Is Lumpy 
Capacity Investment Used and Useful?, 23 ENERGY L.J. 383, 385 (2002) (explaining that 
because a public utility can only add capacity in large chunks—as by installing a new 
generator or power plant—“new capacity will often give the utility more capacity than it 
needs for immediate purposes”).    
19 See JOEL WALDFOGEL, THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET:  WHY YOU CAN’T ALWAYS 
GET WHAT YOU WANT 21-28, 100-07 (2007) (describing “lumpy markets” and discussing 
how fixed costs can impact product availability). 
20 HENRY FORD WITH SAMUEL CROWTHER, MY LIFE AND WORK 72 (1922); see also 
WALDFOGEL, supra note 19, at 119-20 (attributing Ford’s choice to the costs of customi-
zation and to the quick-drying nature of black enamel). 
21 A separate question is whether market forces would produce the optimal config-
uration without the need for legal restrictions.  See infra Section IV.B. 
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features.22  Yun-chien Chang and Henry Smith have recently identified 
three features they view as essential to property rights:  in rem rights, 
the right to exclude, and rights “running with assets.”23  Their ap-
proach suggests that the concept of property is itself lumpy, requiring 
some minimum set of attributes in order to bear the label “property.”24  
Moreover, each of the three attributes that Chang and Smith iden-
tify strongly implicates lumpiness.  In rem rights lump together the 
world at large when defining duties toward a property owner and 
thereby economize on the production of legal relationships between 
owners and nonowners.25  Exclusion protects an undifferentiated set of 
uses by relying on a complete (rather than broken or partial) concep-
tual boundary around a resource’s edges.26  Rights that run with assets 
respond to the fact that property interests in other people’s land, such 
as easements, exhibit a form of temporal lumpiness:  they are often 
most valuable when consumed over long periods that are not inter-
rupted by changes in ownership.27   
More broadly, a system of property rights may embody or produce 
lumpy public goods.  There may be no single discrete “step” between a 
system of property rights that is too insecure to be meaningful and one 
that is sufficiently secure to induce widespread reliance and invest-
ment.  But it seems likely that some threshold must be reached before 
the bulk of the benefits of the property system can be realized, and 
that enhancements beyond a certain level add relatively little to per-
ceptions of stability.28  Similarly, patterns of lumpy property use and 
 
22 This point bears on the larger theoretical debate about whether a “bundle of 
sticks” is an appropriate metaphor for property.  See infra Section III.A. 
23 Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common 
Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 24-27), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017816. 
24 See id. at 33 (arguing that a legal relation that lacks one or more of three enu-
merated attributes of property is “at best quasi-property”).   
25 See id. at 24-25.  See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/ 
Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001) (discussing the significance of the 
distinction between in rem rights associated with property and in personam rights asso-
ciated with contract).   
26 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1755-
57 (2004) (describing property’s “exclusion strategy”); see also infra Section II.A.   
27 Chang and Smith do not focus on temporal lumpiness as such, but instead sug-
gest that the “running with assets” approach follows from viewing property as “a thing.”  
Chang & Smith, supra note 23, at 31-33. 
28 In other words, the production of security in property rights may follow an S -
shaped curve like the one in Figure 2 above, if a certain “critical mass” of stability is 
required to induce investment.  For discussion and modeling of “critical mass” in vari-
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consumption may produce second-order lumpy goods, like uniformity.  
Finally, doctrines that protect, regulate, standardize, adjudicate, and 
reconfigure property entitlements may be informed and limited by 
ideas of lumpiness.  The next Part provides some examples. 
II.  LUMPY DOCTRINES 
The sections below examine how lumpiness relates doctrinally to 
three of property law’s basic moves:  enforcing exclusion, limiting con-
figurations, and dividing and aggregating entitlements.  Although my 
treatment here is necessarily illustrative rather than exhaustive, it sug-
gests the range of property doctrines implicated by lumpiness. 
A.  Enforcing Exclusion 
Just as a partial bridge is no bridge, leaving one side of a parcel of 
land legally unprotected from intruders undoes the idea of exclusion.  
Thus, an “exclusion strategy”29 depends on defining resources as things 
with closed edges.30  Understanding property holdings as opaque, self-
contained “modules”31 with hard exclusionary edges makes property a 
lumpy institution.  On this view, breaking into the capsule, even trivial-
ly, alters its integrity and may have any number of unanticipated ef-
fects that only the owner can fully know or appreciate.   
This vision of property fits well with a system of strong “property 
rule” protection against trespass and physical interference.32  It explains 
 
ous social and collective action contexts, see THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES 
AND MACROBEHAVIOR 91-110 (1978), and Oliver et al., supra note 11.    
29 See Smith, supra note 26, at 1755 (“In an exclusion strategy, the law sets up rough 
signals (informational variables, proxies) defining the boundaries of the asset.”). 
30 See Chang & Smith, supra note 23, at 25-26 (explaining how exclusion relates to 
“thing-based packages of rights—property”); see also Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law 
of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1702 (2012) (“The exclusion strategy defines a chunk 
of the world—a thing—under the owner’s control . . . .”).  To say that an exclusion-
based property interest requires complete boundaries does not mean that it requires 
impermeable boundaries, nor does it require that the boundaries constitute the only 
means of protecting the property’s value.  See Chang & Smith, supra note 23, at 26 (not-
ing the respective roles of governance and exclusion). 
31 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL IN-
QUIRIES L. 5, 16-18 (2009) (drawing connections between exclusion strategies and 
modularity, and noting that modules hide information as a way of managing complexity). 
32 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal-
ienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105-06 (1972) (distinguish-
ing “property rule” protection, under which property may only be transferred if the 
owner chooses to sell, from “liability rule” protection, under which property may be 
transferred against the will of the owner at an externally determined price).  
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why even harmless encroachments may be addressed injunctively or 
strongly deterred with supercompensatory remedies.  As Henry Smith 
has emphasized, property rule protection legally constructs a disconti-
nuity at the parcel’s edges by making the consequences of boundary 
crossing highly significant.33  That legal discontinuity operates on both 
sides of the border.  Not only can trivial and harmless encroachments 
be prevented and punished,34 but very significant and harmful impacts 
emanating from outside the property’s edges may either be entirely 
nonactionable or may be redressed only with damages—a liability rule 
solution.35   
Explicitly focusing on lumpiness pushes us to ask whether the 
legally constructed discontinuity corresponds to some underlying dis-
continuity in how property is produced or consumed, or whether it is an 
artifact of an earlier set of social circumstances that we should seek to 
unwind.  The notion of modularity suggests an underlying lumpiness in 
consumption utility:  if property’s uses are opaque and potentially idio-
syncratic, having the whole thing may be enormously different from 
having almost the whole thing, and in ways nonowners may be unable to 
understand.  This proposition, however, is empirically debatable. 
Significantly, most land in metropolitan areas today is subject to 
zoning and other forms of land use controls that take the mystery out 
of what the owner may be doing with her property.  Moreover, mod-
ern threats to owners’ holdings are less likely to involve physical intru-
sions than effects emanating from beyond the property lines—impacts 
from the activities of neighbors, merchants, governmental entities, and 
employers in the surrounding area.36  Some owners surely have con-
struction or other plans for their land that depend on retaining con-
trol over the full spatial and temporal footprint; for them, losing a 
little could mean losing a lot.  But this observation does not necessarily 
support generalizing a hard-edged exclusion strategy for all owners.  It 
is also the case that some owners have plans (such as upgrading to a 
larger home as their family grows) that depend on retaining a mini-
 
33 Smith, supra note 26, at 1750; see also Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1523, 1525-31 (1984) (discussing discontinuities produced by sanctions).  
34 This is not to say that all encroachments are addressed through injunctive or super-
compensatory relief.  See, e.g., Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258, 264 (N.J. 1969) (holding 
that a good faith encroacher who constructed substantial improvements may be eligible 
for equitable relief conveying the encroached-upon land to him at fair market value). 
35 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 32, at 1092.   
36 See LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME:  PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND 
PROPERTY LINES 13-14 (2009). 
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mum sum of home equity.  Yet we have not generalized a strategy for 
protecting owners against all threats to home equity.   
A separate argument for strong exclusion rights might be based on 
economies in the production of property protection—lumpiness in 
supply.  Perhaps it is cheaper for a system of property rights to provide 
property rule protection along parcel edges than to engage in an en-
forcement strategy that requires assessing exactly how and to what de-
gree intruders have drained value from the property.37  In other words, 
the constructed discontinuity in legal consequences at the parcel edges 
may have less to do with the ways that owners value and use their land 
than with the way that property protection is most economically pro-
duced.  This claim, however, also requires empirical support—
evidence of the relative costs of different kinds of property protection 
as well as of the efficacy of each type of protection in achieving the 
goals of property under present social conditions.   
B.  Limiting Configurations 
Property is dispensed and consumed only in certain chunks, rather 
than in all imaginable combinations.  For example, public housing 
assistance in the United States is distributed by allowing households to 
queue up for units that meet particular standards,38 rather than by 
distributing housing dollars evenly among all eligible families.39  An 
argument for deploying housing dollars in discrete lumps, even if it 
 
37 See Ellickson, supra note 3, at 1328-29 (maintaining that boundary crossings are 
easier to detect and address than are unwanted behaviors occurring on the property). 
38 Demand for public housing exceeds supply so significantly in some areas of the 
United States that families must win a lottery simply to be placed on a lengthy waiting 
list.  See, e.g., Family Wait List Lottery FAQs, CHI. HOUSING AUTHORITY, http:// 
www.thecha.org/pages/family_wait_list_lottery_faqs/76.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) 
(providing information about the 2010 random lottery that added 40,000 families to 
the waitlist for Chicago public housing, and indicating that those who were successful 
in the lottery may have to wait five to seven years before being screened).     
39 David Super uses the term “functional entitlement” to denote public benefits 
that are provided at a level that is intended to be sufficient to meet a particular need.  
David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 655-58 
(2004).  Although Super finds functional entitlements to be “relatively rare in public 
benefits law,” housing assistance programs that require units to meet certain standards fit 
the definition.  Id. at 657 & n.109.  Some households do require deeper subsidies than 
others in order to obtain housing that complies with the applicable standard.  Thus, to 
the extent that public housing authorities have discretion to target assistance based on 
income, they can exercise some choice about how to slice up the available funding.  See, 
e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 982.201(b)(2) (2011) (setting parameters for income-targeting of ten-
ant-based Housing Choice Vouchers).  I thank Nestor Davidson for this point. 
Fennell Revised final.doc (DO NOT DELETE)6/7/2012 7:42 AM 
2012] Lumpy Property 1967 
leaves many families out of the distribution, might follow from the claim 
that “incomplete” or substandard housing bundles add little to a house-
hold’s well-being until the quality level reaches a certain threshold.40  
Thus, a social welfare system faced with six needy families and only 
enough building materials to construct one full dwelling might ration-
ally decide not to divide the available building components equally 
among the families, but rather to construct one full unit.   
The law’s interventions in property configurations are not limited 
to the public housing context.  Notably, the numerus clausus principle 
limits new property forms and thus maintains a fixed and chunky 
property menu.41  Because laws and regulations cluster around approved 
entries on the property menu, hybrid alternatives can be hard to initiate 
and sustain.42  In the housing realm, for example, marked gaps exist on 
the tenure spectrum, leaving out a range of innovative hybrid arrange-
ments that would blend elements of renting and owning.43  The result is 
a lumpiness in property forms that requires households either to take 
on a large chunk of risk by becoming owners or to continue renting; 
households whose ideal point lies between the two tenure forms have 
to settle for more risk or less.44  Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith posit 
 
40 For a related discussion, see CHARLES KARELIS, THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY 67-
81, 127-29 (2007).  Karelis suggests that the marginal utility of money may rise within 
certain ranges because it allows larger and hence disproportionately more effective 
doses of relief to be applied.  Id. at 67-71; see also Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The 
Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 298-99 (1948) (presenting 
the Friedman-Savage utility curve, which hypothesizes that there are intervals in which 
the marginal utility of money increases); Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge:  Declining Mar-
ginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904, 929-39 (2011) (providing an overview 
of the Friedman-Savage curve and related empirical work).    
41 See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the 
Law of Property:  The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000). 
42 For a discussion of the numerus clausus doctrine as a “regulatory platform,” see 
Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
1597, 1644-50 (2008).   
43 Such hybrids do exist, but they are limited in scope and are not well supported 
by current tax and regulatory regimes.  See, e.g., Andrew Caplin et al., Rectifying the Tax 
Treatment of Shared Appreciation Mortgages, 62 TAX L. REV. 505, 508, 514-15 (2009) (cata-
loguing the tax obstacles to one such hybrid, shared appreciation mortgages, which 
entitle lenders to a share of the property’s appreciation instead of fixed interest pay-
ments); Andrew Caplin et al., Home Equity Insurance:  A Pilot Project 24-28 (Yale Int’l Ctr. 
for Fin., Working Paper No. 03-12, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=410141 
(describing regulatory barriers to implementing a home equity insurance program in 
Syracuse, New York).   
44 See ANDREW CAPLIN ET AL., HOUSING PARTNERSHIPS:  A NEW APPROACH TO A 
MARKET AT A CROSSROADS 6 (1997) (“The ‘all or nothing’ constraint on home owner-
ship forces households to make the stark choice between rental accommodations’ dis-
advantages and complete ownership’s harsh financial realities.”). 
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that information costs justify the limited property menu; in their view, 
idiosyncratic tenure forms impose informational externalities by mak-
ing it harder for both potential counterparties and strangers to learn 
about the relevant rights.45 
A different rationale for the limited property menu relates to econ-
omies of scale in producing and comprehending law.  For example, 
legal restrictions may be more easily built around identifiable tenure 
nodes.46  There may be other network effects as well.  For instance, pro-
spective homebuyers may confront a more comprehensible risk envi-
ronment when everyone in a given neighborhood shares the same 
tenure form.47  Yet, even if we accept informational or network external-
ities as an argument favoring a limited menu, we would still want some 
account of why the particular entries on our current property menu are 
at least roughly the correct ones, both in number and content.   
Other interventions into property configuration choices might be 
justified as attempts to improve or conserve opportunities for future 
reaggregation.48  This rationale has been invoked as a potential expla-
nation for everything from minimum lot sizes to the rule against per-
petuities.49  The issue of reconfiguration arises when there is a change 
over time in the optimal scale of resource use.50  For example, land 
that at Time One was most valuable subdivided into townhouse-sized 
parcels might at Time Two be best suited to a large shopping center or 
an urban park.  If a certain minimum scale is necessary for the new effi-
cient use, even small shortfalls can have significant negative impacts on 
social value.  Stephen Shmanske and Daniel Packey give the example 
 
45 Merrill & Smith, supra note 41, at 31-34.  For a critique of this claim, see Glen O. 
Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1484-88 (2004).  See also 
Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law (revisiting the standardization argu-
ments with respect to third-party information costs), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 148, 157-65 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).  
46 See Davidson, supra note 42, at 1635, 1652-53 (observing that standardization car-
ries potential benefits for producers of law to the extent that “categorization channels 
legal innovation and regulation” and each existing form “provides a relatively stable 
point of focus around which changes in meaning and content can be negotiated”). 
47 See Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk, 60 DUKE L.J. 1285, 1344-45 (2011).  
48 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 
1173-82 (1999). 
49 See id. (examining how these limitations prevent “excessive fragmentation”). 
50 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three 
Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1024 (2008) (“Aggregation and disaggregation of 
parcels in order to permit each use as it becomes most efficient is not an easy matter.”); 
Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons (discussing the problem of 
shifts in efficient scale over time), in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
PROPERTY LAW, supra note 45, at 35, 48.   
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of a golf course that requires a minimum of ninety-one acres to be via-
ble.51  If the golf course would be the best use of the land, but only 
ninety acres can be assembled, the land will be relegated to a lower-
valued use, such as a park.52   
A change in the optimal scale of use can introduce a mismatch be-
tween the chunks in which property is supplied (by those who already 
hold it) and the chunks in which it is demanded.  Here we see an in-
teresting feature of real property that distinguishes it from many other 
products and services:  it is supplied in packages and quantities that 
are determined solely by past patterns of ownership and use, and by 
the legal rules governing transfers.53  The old maxim about real es-
tate—“they aren’t making any more of it”54—translates into a strong 
and important technological constraint on the ability of supply to 
adapt to current demand.  All of the property available for use by 
future owners exists in the hands of current owners, each of whom 
holds a spatial monopoly.  Although these spatial monopolies provide 
little leverage under most circumstances (close locational substitutes 
typically abound), they can produce well-known difficulties when indi-
vidually owned parcels represent integral and complementary pieces 
of a much more valuable whole.55 
The question remains, however, whether and when the costs of 
restricting alienability (that is, keeping transacting parties from slicing 
entitlements as thinly and idiosyncratically as they desire) are out-
weighed by the prospect of easing future reconfiguration diff iculties.  
The answer depends on a variety of factors, including the degree to 
 
51 Shmanske & Packey, supra note 17, at 72.   
52 Id.  Obviously, we can imagine instances where a park, or even completely un-
used open space, would be more valuable than a golf course.  The value of these uses, 
too, may similarly implicate lumpiness, as where a species’ habitat requires a certain 
size and configuration of contiguous land.  See Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading Species:  A 
New Direction for Habitat Trading Programs, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 20-25 (2007) (de-
scribing how contiguity and shape factor into the habitat value of a tract).   
53 Cf. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 
307-08 (2008) (“Pre-owned resources, and land in particular, bear the legal and physi-
cal imprint of the agendas set by prior owners.” (footnote omitted)). 
54 A variant of this aphorism has been attributed to Will Rogers.  See PETER WOLF, 
LAND IN AMERICA:  ITS VALUE, USE, AND CONTROL 6 (1981) (“Will Rogers advised the 
whole country:  ‘Buy land.  They ain’t making any more of the stuff.’”).   
55 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Justified Monopolies:  Regulating Pharmaceuticals and 
Telecommunications, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103, 108-09 (2005) (observing that a land-
owner’s monopoly is usually not problematic); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of 
Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 75 (1986) (discussing assembly problems that can 
arise from property owners’ monopoly power).   
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which we can reliably predict the optimal scale of future uses,56 the 
relative cost of coercive reconfiguration,57 and the likely shape of the 
production functions through which particular configurations gener-
ate value.58  For example, it typically will be unclear whether future 
efficient uses will require more aggregation or more disaggregation.  
Anticommons theorists focus their attention exclusively on the dangers 
of fragmentation and suggest that aggregation (or reaggregation) is far 
more difficult to achieve than disaggregation.59  But if consolidated 
holdings implicate the interests of multiple stakeholders with either de 
facto or de jure vetoes, disaggregation may also prove difficult.  For 
instance, holdout dynamics may block efforts to move property out of 
common ownership and into individual ownership.60 
There are many other complications that would benefit from 
scholarly attention.  Imagine, for example, that a developer needs a con-
tiguous eighty-five–acre parcel within an area containing one hundred 
acres.  Will her chances of a private assembly be better if she faces five 
owners who each own twenty-acre lots, or one hundred owners who 
each own one-acre lots?  It is impossible to be sure without more in-
formation,61 but we can say this much:  each owner’s contribution will 
 
56 See Larissa Katz, Red Tape and Gridlock, 23 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 99, 
120 -21 (2010) (arguing that Michael Heller’s approach implicitly and incorrectly 
assumes that we can identify a resource’s “ideal use” in advance and arrange property 
rights to achieve it). 
57 See infra Section II.C. 
58 See supra subsection I.A.1. 
59 See, e.g., Heller, supra note 48, at 1165-66 (positing that fragmentation “may op-
erate as a one-way ratchet” that impedes recombination); Francesco Parisi, Entropy in 
Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595, 627 (2002) (“[S]ub-optimal fragmentation can be easily 
corrected ex post, while excessive fragmentation is likely to be irreversible . . . .”).   
60 See, e.g., CARL J. DAHLMAN, THE OPEN FIELD SYSTEM AND BEYOND:  A PROPERTY 
RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF AN ECONOMIC INSTITUTION 187 (1980) (describing the potential 
holdout problem among opponents of enclosure and explaining how legislation ad-
dressed it); Carol M. Rose, Evolution of Property Rights (explaining how earlier stake-
holders can impede the evolution of environmental regulation), in 2 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 93, 97 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); 
see also Fennell, supra note 50, at 45-46 (observing that holdout dynamics can beset 
moves from commons property to private property as well as moves in the opposite 
direction).  
61 For example, we would need to know the degree to which contiguity is required 
or whether there are other constraints on the shape or configuration of the assembled 
parcels.  These questions will determine the degree to which different parcels compete 
with each other and the degree to which the problem breaks down into one in which 
some smaller subset of parcels (such as those in the core of the configuration) exhibit 
perfect complementarity.  See Scott Duke Kominers & E. Glen Weyl, Holdout in the As-
sembly of Complements:  A Problem for Market Design, 102 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROCS.) 
360 (2012) (comparing assembly problems exhibiting perfect complementarity with 
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be critical in the case of twenty-acre holdings, whereas fifteen owners’ 
contributions will be unnecessary where the pieces are smaller.  Once 
we consider the possibility that production functions can vary depend-
ing on the size of the pieces in play, it is no longer self-evident that 
smaller holdings always perform less well on private aggregation tasks.  
C.  Dividing and Aggregating 
When market transactions prove unequal to the task of shifting 
from one scale of use or form of ownership to another, the govern-
ment may turn to coercive reconfiguration, as through eminent domain 
or partition.62  The doctrines surrounding these operations are, or 
should be, sensitive to the ways in which aggregations of entitlements 
may produce nonlinear lumps of value.   
1.  Eminent Domain 
Property’s lumpiness arises most saliently in the context of land as-
sembly.  Eminent domain routinely addresses situations where the 
whole is (or may be) greater than the sum of its parts.  Sometimes this is 
dramatically so, as where a planned highway—much like a bridge—
becomes close to useless if segments are missing.  In other cases, having 
all the pieces of a particular contiguous holding would greatly increase 
the value of the entire holding, even if it would be possible to glean pos-
itive returns from an aggregation short of the whole.  Relying on private 
transactions to assemble land is one alternative, and configuration rules 
may bear on the ease or difficulty of these transactions.  But a core prob-
lem of monopoly power (holdouts), coupled with private information 
about reservation prices, can plague many attempted aggregations.63  
Thus, private efforts to reconfigure property—whether to achieve more 
efficient lumps or to break down inefficient lumps—may run aground 
due to strategic bargaining problems or other transaction costs. 
Coercive overrides can solve this problem, but they carry costs of 
their own.  Notably, it is often unclear ex ante whether an assembly is 
efficient or whether the property pieces are collectively more valuable 
in an unassembled state.  Relying on private transactions largely rules 
 
those that require all the components in one of several possible clusters, as well as with 
those that require one component from each of several clusters). 
62 See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 50, at 1049 (noting these and other ex-
amples of “forced aggregation or disaggregation”).   
63 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.   
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out inefficient assemblies,64 but bargaining impasse may block efficient 
assemblies.  Eminent domain and other coercive transfers solve the 
impasse problem but at the potential cost of allowing some inefficient 
assemblies to go forward.  Explicitly recognizing lumpiness provides a 
basis for choosing between these alternatives.  Where strict comple-
mentarities are present and all the parcels are essential to a valuable 
assembly, coercion may be the only way to overcome strategic holdout 
problems—even though there is some risk of an inefficient assembly.  
But where the complementarities are not strict and not all the compo-
nents are essential, the bargaining dynamic changes in ways that can 
make coercion less justified.  
Thus, lumpiness provides traction on the rationale for coercion and 
offers a reasoned basis for constructing functional limits on its use.65  
Significantly, however, the spatial aggregation facilitated by eminent 
domain may not be the only aggregation in the picture:  there may also 
be temporal or community-based aggregations that will be disrupted if 
land is assembled involuntarily.66  Differences in the respective produc-
tion functions of these competing assemblies can also have a large 
impact on the need for, and impact of, coercive reconfigurations.67  
2.  Regulatory Takings 
Sometimes coercive aggregations occur not through condemna-
tion of land but rather through regulatory action that seeks to achieve 
some consistent result across parcels or to otherwise employ existing 
property rights in pursuit of a collective goal.  Some of the lumpiness-
related points discussed in the context of exclusion reappear in regu-
latory takings doctrine.  Consider Loretto’s per se rule for permanent 
 
64 Private transactions could generate inefficient assemblies under some circum-
stances, as where the valuation of different parcel holders is interdependent and early 
sales transactions alter the value associated with the remaining parcels.  See Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry:  Communities and Individuals in Law 
and Economics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 119-24 (2004). 
65 See Merrill, supra note 55, at 72-93 (analyzing eminent domain as a means for 
overcoming impediments to private bargains); see also infra Section IV.C.  
66 See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 64, at 113 -19 (discussing positive 
“community externalities” that stem from keeping a community intact).  Takings are not 
the only way that these community aggregations can be disrupted.  For example, a devel-
oper who acquires a subset of the community through voluntary sales transactions can 
also break up social networks and interfere with the provision of “lumpy” local goods, 
thereby potentially inducing the rest of the community to sell as well.  See id. at 119-24. 
67 See infra Section IV.C. 
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physical encroachments, no matter how small.68  This rule deepens the 
discontinuity in legal results at the property’s boundary by treating 
even trivial physical incursions as takings for which just compensation 
must be paid,69 while allowing more severe financial impacts associated 
with regulatory changes to go uncompensated.70   
Another important line in takings law proceeds from the premise 
that losing all of some particular interest is a more severe interference 
than losing part of the value of an interest—even if the dollar value of 
the interference is much larger in the latter situation.  This idea ap-
pears in Lucas’s per se rule, which holds that regulations that remove 
all economically viable use will always constitute takings except where 
those regulations reflect background restrictions on title.71  It also sur-
faces in the Supreme Court’s invocation of “distinct investment-backed 
expectations” in the Penn Central test.72  And the same “all versus some” 
distinction features in the Court’s refusal to “conceptually sever”73 time 
slices in Tahoe-Sierra74 and air rights in Penn Central.75 
 
68 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982) 
(finding  a cable company’s legislatively authorized installation of “plates, boxes, wires, 
bolts and screws” on an apartment building to be a taking).   
69 The argument from lumpiness might be taken even further:  given complemen-
tarities, paying for the encroachment alone may be undercompensatory.  A more pro-
tective rule might force the government to choose between taking nothing and taking a 
larger chunk than it might otherwise elect (and compensating for it).  See Bell & Par-
chomovsky, supra note 50, at 1064-65 (observing that an “asset-oriented perspective” 
would argue against a “minimalist” approach of taking as little through eminent domain 
as possible). 
70 See e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law:  The Dissents in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 955, 957-59 (1993) (criti-
cizing the distinction that takings law draws between physical impositions and reduc-
tions in value).   
71 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
72 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citation 
omitted); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005) (quoting 
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).  The phrase was based on Frank Michelman’s notion of 
a “distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation.”  Frank I. 
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:  Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just 
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1233 (1967). 
73 See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:  Cross Currents in the Ju-
risprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674-79 (1998) (coining the term “con-
ceptual severance” and tracing the concept’s use in the Supreme Court’s takings 
jurisprudence).  If litigants were allowed to slice up their interests in property concep-
tually, any regulatory encroachment could be treated as the elimination of “all” of the 
interest that was regulated away.  See id.  
74 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
331 (2002) (“Petitioners’ ‘conceptual severance’ argument is unavailing because it 
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Initially, this distinction might seem to be in tension with a notion 
of lumpiness and with my suggestion above that physical encroach-
ments are problematic precisely because they break open a unified 
whole.  Note, however, that the all-versus-some distinction is not ap-
plied in contexts where there has been a permanent physical en-
croachment, but rather where there has been an interference with one 
or more ways of deriving value from property.  Such an interference is 
arguably more analogous to a stock losing value than to a capsule 
breaking open.76 
Indeed, current regulatory takings doctrine seems almost to assume 
a form of reverse lumpiness in which losses scarcely register until one 
has lost almost the whole thing—or at least some whole thing.  Unlike a 
bridge that stops generating value after the first major part is removed, 
property, on this view, is more like a tank of gas that can generate excel-
lent value even when it is significantly depleted.  Pushing the analogy 
further, compare the effects of gasoline siphoning on family A, whose 
large vehicle has half its thirty-gallon tank drained away, and on family 
B, that owns three identical vehicles with ten-gallon tanks, one of which 
is drained entirely.  While A suffers a greater loss in absolute terms 
(fifteen gallons rather than ten gallons), B loses more in vehicular 
functionality. 
Whether or not property should be viewed in these terms is open 
to question.  As Frank Michelman has observed, there may be some-
thing psychologically salient and especially demoralizing about losing 
an entire thing due to government action.77  That reaction might be a 
product of the binary way that objects tend to be acquired—all at 
 
ignores Penn Central ’s admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must focus on 
‘the parcel as a whole.’” (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31)). 
75 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130 (“‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single 
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular 
segment have been entirely abrogated.”).   
76 This observation raises the question of why governmentally imposed losses in 
value do not always count as takings, an inquiry that relates conceptually to the litera-
ture on the line between taxes and takings.  See, e.g., Amnon Lehavi, The Taking/Taxing 
Taxonomy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1257-62 (2010) (emphasizing American property law’s 
differential treatment of governmental acts that reduce value and those that interfere 
with exclusion or other core property rights).  For a novel discontinuity-based argu-
ment for the distinction (albeit one that would require some changes in current tak-
ings doctrine), see Eric Kades, Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings:  The 
Continuous Burdens Principle, and Its Broader Application, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 189, 223-56 
(2002). 
77 See Michelman, supra note 72, at 1233-34 (noting this possibility, but recognizing 
that the assumptions underlying it “are surely debatable”).   
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once, rather than through a process of slow accretion.78  If people tend 
to think in all-or-nothing lumps as a result of acquisition protocols, 
then they might also be inclined to think in all-or-nothing terms when 
it comes to losing value.  The question remains, however, whether this 
is simply a psychological artifact that proves misleading in the takings 
realm, or whether it tracks onto something meaningful about how 
people experience—or produce value from—property.79 
Another potential rationale for the “discrete twig”80 approach to 
takings law might lie in production cost discontinuities—here, the 
cost of regulating without placing disproportionate burdens on owners.  
Michelman’s notion of settlement costs bears on this point.81  If 
screening for and settling up over the loss of a discrete thing is rela-
tively cheap, this could explain the law’s introduction of a disconti-
nuity at the point of complete loss. 
3.  Judicial Takings 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stop the Beach Renourish-
ment 82 has drawn new attention to the possibility that a court-initiated 
change in property law could amount to a compensable taking.  Some 
commentators worry that such a judicial takings doctrine might ham-
per courts in carrying out the usual business of adjudication and 
thereby impair the organic development of the common law.83  In the 
 
78 Adverse possession and prescriptive claims are notable exceptions.  There are also 
a variety of lease-to-own and installment purchase arrangements that spread acquisition 
over time.   
79 For discussion on perceptions of property and the extent to which those percep-
tions are manipulable, see, for example, Jonathan Remy Nash, Packaging Property:  The 
Effect of Paradigmatic Framing of Property Rights, 83 TUL. L. REV. 691, 715-24 (2009), and 
Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449, 
479-84 (2010). 
80 Michelman, supra note 72, at 1233-34.   
81 See id. at 1214 (defining “settlement costs” as the “time, effort, and resources” 
necessary “to reach compensation settlements adequate to avoid demoralization 
costs”); see also id. at 1234 (describing as “probably true” the proposition that such “spe-
cially painful” deprivations of a discrete thing “can usually be identified by compensa-
tion tribunals with relative ease”).   
82 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 
(2010).  All eight participating justices agreed that the Florida Supreme Court’s rejec-
tion of a challenge to a beach restoration project did not constitute a taking.  Id. at 2610-
13.  However, a four-justice plurality endorsed the idea of a judicial taking.  See id. at 
2601-02.  
83 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collateral Attack 
on State Court Property Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 112-13 (2011) 
(expressing concern that a judicial takings doctrine could “chill the process of common-
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search for limiting principles to address this concern, the notion of 
lumpiness might well play a role.  
Consider again the recurring theme in takings law that losing a 
discrete thing is a more severe interference than losing a portion of a 
thing’s value, and hence more likely to be considered a taking.  Trans-
planted into the judicial realm, this principle would seem to offer little 
insulation against the threat to common law adjudication.  After all, 
many property disputes involve some discrete interest, such as an 
easement, a chattel, or even an estate in land.  But examining lumpi-
ness on the other side of the transaction provides a potential limiting 
principle.  In virtually all regulatory takings committed by political 
actors, the thing taken from the owner is not just shifted to someone 
else, but rather is combined with interests taken from other owners to 
form a larger assemblage of entitlements.  Just as eminent domain can 
explicitly generate an assembly surplus by putting together parcels of 
land, regulatory action generates surplus through regulatory assem-
blages, whether a path along a beach, a conservation goal, or a uni-
form plan for the preservation of landmarks.  
By contrast, most adjudicated property disputes boil down to, 
“Who owns this twig?”  Regardless of the case’s outcome, the disputed 
interest will remain a twig.  In rare instances, though, a judicial decision 
could have the effect of assembling many property interests together 
to achieve a larger goal.  For example, a court might change beach-
access rights and thereby effectively construct a new easement across 
the property of many landowners.  Such an exercise more closely re-
sembles the acts of eminent domain undertaken by the political 
branches and looks less like ordinary dispute resolution.84  The pursuit 
of regulatory or spatial lumps might thus be used to help pour content 
into an emerging judicial takings doctrine.85 
 
law decisionmaking”); Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 247, 265-66 (2011) (contending that the plurality’s view of judicial 
takings is inconsistent with an “evolutionary view of the law”). 
84 See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62 (1965) (making 
an analogous distinction “between the role of government as participant and the gov-
ernment as mediator in the process of competition among economic claims”); cf. 
Thomas W. Merrill, Why Lingle Is Half Right, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 421, 424-28 (2010) 
(describing a “boundary maintenance” approach to regulatory takings that compares 
how much a given regulatory act resembles eminent domain with how much the act 
resembles an exercise of the police power). 
85 The normative question of whether a judicial takings doctrine should be recog-
nized at all is one I do not address here.   
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4.  Ordinary Adjudication 
Despite occasional results like the one in Popov v. Hayashi, which 
split ownership of a home-run baseball,86 property law usually delivers 
all-or-nothing outcomes.87  Does the lumpy character of these decisions 
match some underlying feature of the way utility is thought to map 
onto property, or is there something about the process of producing 
results that creates pressure toward lumpy outcomes?  The questions 
are empirical ones, but both suppositions could play a role.  Land and 
other things may be much more valuable when kept physically and 
temporally intact, and high transaction costs might impede reuniting 
the whole after pieces are dispersed among litigants.  A system that 
dispenses lumpy outcomes may also be cheaper to administer.  The 
party with the weaker claim to an asset cannot gain leverage by win-
ning a fractional share, and courts need not parse the relative strength 
of claims falling short of the level necessary to win a case.88 
The treatment of cotenants’ interests in partition cases offers an 
interesting window into the lumpiness of property adjudication, pre-
cisely because the concurrent interests of the parties preclude an  
entirely all-or-nothing outcome.  Although traditionally preferred, parti-
tion in kind (physically dividing the land) is much less common than 
partition by sale (keeping the land intact but dividing the sales pro-
ceeds).89  The widespread use of partition by sale, and the rationales 
underlying it, map onto notions of spatial lumpiness.  Where physically 
dividing the land would render it less valuable, courts will often order 
a partition by sale instead.90  What, then, could account for the histori-
cal preference for partition in kind?  Temporal lumpiness may offer 
 
86 No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002); see also 
R.H. Helmholz, Equitable Division and the Law of Finders, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 313, 322-27 
(1983) (assessing the prospects for equitable division in the law of finding and noting 
examples of its limited use in cases involving joint finders).   
87 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 113 (7th ed. 2010) (noting that 
property law “awards a finder all or nothing, subject to the rights of the true owner”); 
see also LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 139-55 (2011) (noting the prevalence of 
“either/or” results in law and discussing possible explanations and related challenges).   
88 To be sure, most property cases settle rather than go to trial, thereby producing 
what amounts to split outcomes on the ground.  Nonetheless, the parties bargain in the 
shadow of the courts’ all-or-nothing propensities.  
89 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 87, at 343.   
90 See, e.g., Johnson v. Hendrickson, 24 N.W.2d 914, 916 (S.D. 1946) (reading a 
statute to permit partition by sale “if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the 
value of the land when divided into parcels is substantially less than its value when 
owned by one person”).  
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an answer.  For example, an elderly cotenant who has resided on a 
parcel throughout her whole life may experience an extraordinarily 
sharp discontinuity in utility between being allowed to stay there until 
the end of her life and being ousted even a day before her death.91  To 
return to a metaphor introduced earlier, partition must break open 
the capsule of property, either spatially or temporally; the question is 
which of the two is less costly.   
III.  LUMPINESS AND PROPERTY THEORY 
The doctrinal lumpiness in property law described above carries 
important implications for property theory.  The following sections 
show how lumpiness bears on two current theoretical debates:  the sta-
tus of the bundle-of-sticks metaphor and the tension between exclu-
sion and social obligation. 
A.  Bundles and Sticks 
The idea of property as a “bundle of sticks” or “bundle of rights” has 
been associated with the work of the Legal Realists, and, more recently, 
the law and economics movement.92  The metaphor has come under 
sustained attack for its alleged implicit suggestion that property lacks a 
stable core and comprises nothing more than a loosely assembled and 
 
91 A similar rationale seems to have been in play in Delfino v. Vealencis, a Connecti-
cut case in which the court ordered partition in kind.  See 436 A.2d 27, 33 (Conn. 1980) 
(“[O]ne of the tenants in common has been in actual and exclusive possession of a 
portion of the property for a substantial period of time; . . . has made her home on the 
property; . . . [and] derives her livelihood from the operation of a business on this por-
tion of the property, as her family before her has for many years.”); see also Ark Land 
Co. v. Harper, 599 S.E.2d 754, 761 (W. Va. 2004) (holding that the economic value of 
the property alone is not dispositive and that “[e]vidence of longstanding ownership, 
coupled with sentimental or emotional interests in the property, may also be consid-
ered in deciding whether the interests of the party opposing the sale will be prejudiced 
by the property’s sale”). 
92 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law 
and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 365-66 (2001) (discussing the role of the bundle-of-
rights model in the thinking of the Legal Realists and law and economics scholars); see 
also Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property:  A Bundle of Rights?  Prologue to the Proper-
ty Symposium, 8 ECON J. WATCH 193, 194-201 (2011) (compiling views on the bundle-of-
rights conceptualization of property).  The metaphor of a “bundle of sticks” stands for 
the same idea as the “bundle of rights” and is “an only slightly less popular” formula-
tion.  Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheers for 
Merrill and Smith, 8 ECON J. WATCH 215, 215 (2011). 
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endlessly disaggregable pile of use rights.93  Both the defenders and the 
critics of the bundle approach have a point—and that point, I suggest, 
boils down to lumpiness.  The bundle metaphor may be criticized for 
paying too little attention to within-property-holding complementari-
ties.  But the vision of property as an indivisible lump ignores a com-
peting set of complementarities—those that are, or might be, made up 
of rights ceded from a number of property owners.  What neither 
model offers is what property theory needs most:  a way to weigh these 
two sets of conflicting complementarities against each other. 
The question of whether property is (or should be treated as) an 
indivisible lump has played a prominent, if not always fully articulated, 
role in the bundle-of-rights debates.94  Robert Ellickson captures the 
possibility that property might be a step good when he suggests that Mi-
chael Heller might analogize rights in property to cards in a deck—a 
package of complementary elements that becomes virtually worthless 
(at least for playing card games) if even one is missing.95  But is property 
really a step good constructed of such strongly complementary elements 
that removing one will drastically deplete its value?  One difficulty lies in 
figuring out exactly what the sticks in the bundle represent.96  
Sometimes the sticks are described as use rights, with different 
twigs representing, say, the right to build a house, to emit smoke, to 
grow tall trees, to play pinochle, to turn somersaults on the lawn, and so 
on.97  At other times, the sticks are described as different facets of the 
ownership interest, so that twigs represent the right to alienate, to de-
vise, to destroy, to use, and to exclude,98 or as the Hohfeldian units 
 
93 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property is Not Just a Bundle of Rights, 8 ECON J. WATCH 
279, 281-87 (201l).  Other scholars have attacked the metaphor based on different sets 
of concerns.  See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-o-Stix:  A Feminist Critique of 
the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1994). 
94 The state of play can be inferred from a recent symposium devoted entirely to 
the bundle-of-rights metaphor.  Symposium, Property:  A Bundle of Rights?, 8 ECON J. 
WATCH 193 (2011), http://econjwatch.org/issues/volume-8-issue-3-september-2011.  
95 Ellickson, supra note 92, at 218.   
96 For discussion of the many ways the bundle metaphor might be understood, see 
generally J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 
(1996).  Merrill flags a related problem in interpreting the Supreme Court’s use of the 
metaphor:  “how to distinguish between a horizontal stick and a lateral chop” through 
every stick, where only the latter is understood to be a compensable taking.  Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Property Prism, 8 ECON J. WATCH 247, 248 (2011).   
97 See Penner, supra note 96, at 734. 
98 See TONY HONORÉ, Ownership (enumerating eleven “standard incidents of owner-
ship”), in MAKING LAW BIND:  ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 161, 165-66 (1987). 
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into which these incidents of ownership might be subdivided.99  The 
sticks might be also thought to stand for the interests into which a fee 
estate might be disaggregated, such as leaseholds, life estates, and 
easements.100  They might even be understood to represent rights 
against all the other people in the world, so that the twigs might be 
property rights enforceable against Paul, property rights enforceable 
against Kita, property rights enforceable against Oswald, and so on 
until the name of every person on the planet has been listed, save the 
owner’s.101  And, of course, all these elements can be combined in in-
numerable ways (the right to sell pinochle-playing rights to Alex, the 
right to exclude Josephine from the front lawn on Tuesdays, the right to 
emit smoke in the direction of Tess when the wind blows from the 
southwest, and so on) to create a very large bundle of very small sticks.102 
Viewed at this level of specificity, it seems absurd to suggest that 
removing one element would always, or even very often, render prop-
erty valueless.  On the contrary, owners transact over these rights (and 
much larger ones) all the time without ceasing to be owners.  However, 
a weaker but more convincing claim can be made about agglomera-
tion effects among rights that keep aggregation and disaggregation 
from being a zero sum game.103  There is also an information story in 
play:  it may be impossible for a nonowner or governmental entity to 
ascertain the effects of removing a given twig of value, based on an 
analysis of that twig alone.  This observation fits with the idea that 
property is designed to group together complementary elements in 
ways that are intentionally opaque to outsiders and that make inquiry 
into the interrelationship among the elements unnecessary.104 
But the argument from complementarity proves too much.  In a 
complex society, complementarities exist both within and between 
 
99 See Penner, supra note 96, at 724-38 (examining the relationship between 
Hohfeld and Honoré’s work and the bundle-of-rights view of property (citing WESLEY 
NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL 
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923))). 
100 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 92, at 216-17. 
101 See Penner, supra note 96, at 758 (“The disaggregative bundle of rights thesis 
logically entails that an owner of a piece of property holds the rights that every person 
could conceivably have to use that particular thing . . . .”).   
102 See id. (“[I]t boggles the mind to suppose that [the bundle] includes actual 
rights permitting everyone else to do everything with the property, each of which can 
be transferred to the proper person at will.”).   
103 See Ellickson, supra note 92, at  217-18 (emphasizing the importance of “agglom-
eration effects” in property holdings); Smith, supra note 93, at 286(“[A]dding or sub-
tracting a stick to the bundle affects the rest of the sticks.”).   
104 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.   
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owners’ holdings.  The bundle-of-rights image of property, with its 
general inattention to the power of aggregation, offers no way to test 
the strength of within- and between-property complementarities.  But, 
importantly, neither does an exclusion-based vision of property.  While 
treating property as a lumpy and irreducible whole does protect within-
property complementarities, it neglects potential complementarities 
among separately owned elements.  Because those between-property 
complementarities also matter, property cannot operate as a domain of 
categorical exclusion.  And indeed, it does not so operate:  incursions 
into owners’ prerogatives occur regularly.105  What is needed, and what 
existing accounts of property lack, is a way to gain analytical traction on 
the choices that must be made among competing aggregations. 
Another facet of the debate between critics and defenders of the 
bundle metaphor relates to the mutability and social contingency of 
property packages.  Suppose we accept that certain entitlement pack-
ages currently tend to be more valuable for participants in a property 
system.  We would then want to know whether these configurations 
hold greater value due to some underlying fact of the matter.  Indeed, 
we might go further and ask whether property has some inherent pre-
political or natural unity that, even if it is later splintered, retains a 
recognizable form.106  Or are lumps largely of our own making?  If 
the strong complementarity that makes us draw property lines here 
and not there is contingent on social, cultural, and technological fac-
tors, rebundling may become necessary as conditions change.  Recog-
nizing property as a bundle makes the enterprise of rebundling easier 
to contemplate and accomplish—for better or worse.107  
 
105 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PROPERTY THEORY 140 (2012) (describing the right to exclude as “pock-marked . . . 
with exceptions”). 
106 Carol Rose’s metaphor for property protected by a property rule—“the whole 
meatball”—raises similar questions.  Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 
YALE L.J. 2175, 2178-79 (1997). 
107 See Nash & Stern, supra note 79, at 484 (finding that the bundle metaphor eased 
the reframing of property rights).  For some bundle critics, that very ease of rebundling is 
cause for concern, and an independent reason to oppose the bundle metaphor.  See, e.g., 
Klein & Robinson, supra note 92, at 195 (“Characterizing property as a ‘bundle of rights’ 
would make government intervention, not the violating of property, but rather the 
rearranging or redefining of the bundle.”).  But see Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights 
Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist Conceptions of Private Property, 8 ECON J. WATCH 223, 
233 (2011) (“[T]he correct view under the bundle-of-rights theory is that the state pays 
for what it takes, no matter how many sticks of the original bundle the owner retains.”). 
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B.  Exclusion, Obligation, Aggregation 
Positioning itself in opposition to economic or welfarist accounts 
of property, a “progressive property” school has recently emerged to 
argue that property should be informed by a wider range of human 
values, including virtue, social obligation, and democracy.108  Among 
other things, proponents of this approach have questioned the promi-
nence of exclusion in current understandings of property.109  These 
arguments have been met with predictable pushback from scholars 
who view exclusion as a core, defining feature of property.110  These 
disagreements can be usefully reframed as debates over competing 
indivisibilities. 
Consider again the exclusion theorists’ objection to the bundle-of-
sticks metaphor on the ground that it is insufficiently sensitive to the 
complementarities embedded in individual property holdings.  Their 
approach takes as a given the blocky chunks of control that property 
has historically given owners.  Interfering with what seems to be a mi-
nor twig, we are warned, could upend the owner’s plans and projects 
in ways we cannot foresee.  The point resonates:  who are we to decide 
what rights the owner can and cannot do without, or to predict the 
intricate and subtle interweaving of entitlements that lies inside the 
owner’s block of control?  Yet those same blocks of control can quietly 
preclude the assembly of larger-scale sets of rights that might be inter-
woven in much the same way.  If we began with a particular community-
owned assembly of rights in place, the same “take a twig, ruin the 
whole” argument could cut against conferring the rights in question 
on individual owners.  The notion of complementarities is a robust 
 
108 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 
1023-24 (2011) (explaining that for social obligation theorists, property ownership 
involves both rights against others and duties to others); Gregory S. Alexander et al., A 
Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743-44 (2009) (maintaining 
that property serves a broad and incommensurable set of human values).  For a helpful 
overview and critique of different strands within the movement, see Ezra Rosser, Essay, 
The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2013) (manuscript at 11-21), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018030.   
109 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 108, at 1023 (explaining that social obligation 
theorists resist the view that property has exclusion at its core); Rosser, supra note 108, 
at 41 (“A call for a reconsideration of the centrality of the right to exclude in property 
law is perhaps the dominant theme of progressive property scholarship.”).   
110 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Response, Mind the Gap:  The Indirect Relation Between 
Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 963-64 (2009) (not-
ing the advantages of “the basic exclusion mechanism” while acknowledging that exclu-
sion “does not always have the last word”).  
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one, but it is double-edged in the property context:  private property 
can both block and embody complementarities.  
The fact that discontinuities and complementarities often stand on 
both sides of an interaction presents real challenges for property law.  
Households may get disproportionate amounts of utility from having 
unlimited tenure (even if they do not actually stay forever), yet trun-
cating tenure (and hence breaking up one valuable lump) can be in-
strumental in forming valuable spatial lumps, as through eminent 
domain.  Similarly, partition in kind facilitates lumpiness in one direc-
tion (time of tenure) but disrupts it in another (space).  If aggregating 
on one dimension means splintering along another, we might ask 
whether lumpiness on one or the other of these dimensions should get 
more deference, and why.  And here, different property theorists have 
come up with different answers.   
The progressive property movement urges greater attention to the 
value of collective social, cultural, distributive, and deliberative pro-
jects that require the aggregate participation of owners.  Exclusion 
theorists focus instead on the parcel or thing itself as a lump.  The ten-
sion between these approaches can be seen in debates over exclusion 
rights.  There is consensus on some matters:  once an owner opens her 
gate to allow in the general public, she cannot then turn around and 
exclude segments of the public based on protected characteristics.111  
But questions remain about the extent to which an owner should be 
able to open her gate in owner-specified degrees.  The lumpiness of 
broader normative commitments of society is implicated in these de-
bates.  To take the uncontested case, if uniform application of antidis-
crimination norms across communities is necessary to successfully 
advance equality, then allowing owners to parcel out access rights just 
as they please would interfere with that aggregation.112  More contro-
versial examples involve the interplay between private property rights 
and societal patterns of affordable housing, the rights of tenants, and 
access to beaches and other natural resources. 
 
111 See Joseph William Singer, No Right To Exclude:  Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1457-58 (1996) (presenting a view of public accommo-
dations as “a form of property ownership that has limitations on the right to exclude 
built into it”). 
112 Analogous points have been raised in the context of applying subsidiarity prin-
ciples to natural resources.  See Graham Marshall, Nesting, Subsidiarity, and Community-
Based Environmental Governance Beyond the Local Level, 2 INT’L J. COMMONS 75, 78 (2008) 
(noting that higher levels of government are required to solve some problems, includ-
ing discrimination). 
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No doubt progressive property scholars would resist my attempt to 
boil down all of property’s core debates to a question of production 
functions and nonlinearities.113  Yet putting things in those terms offers 
a way for proponents of different approaches to understand one an-
other’s concerns.  It may seem simple for an owner to give up part of 
what she has in the name of social obligation, but if having “nearly all” 
is dramatically less valuable than having “all,” her resistance can be 
better understood.  Likewise, if a given social obligation is viewed as 
part of an aggregation that may be difficult to achieve through unco-
ordinated action, the interest in achieving it coercively, through a re-
conceptualization of property, may resonate with law and economics 
scholars.  
Few would now dispute the normative correctness of the law’s 
choice to accommodate airplane travel by overriding landowners’ hard 
exclusion rights above a certain height.114  Likewise, the law’s commit-
ment to enforcing antidiscrimination norms against private landown-
ers115 has won widespread acceptance.  Other aggregation projects may 
be more controversial than these ever were, and the tradeoffs against 
the landowner’s aggregation of property interests may be quite sharp.  
But framing these tradeoffs in terms of nonlinearities will help to cen-
ter the debate in a more analytically useful place.116   
IV.  LEARNING FROM LUMPINESS 
The issues of lumpiness raised in this Article interact with funda-
mental questions about choice and coercion in property arrangements.  
Viewing these problems through the lens of lumpiness offers useful 
analytic guidance. 
 
113 Nonetheless, it is interesting indeed that Gregory Alexander, one of the primary 
proponents of the “progressive” or “social obligation” school of property, has recently 
invoked Charles Taylor’s notion of “complementarity”—among aspects of an individual’s 
life—in discussing a pluralistic, social obligation vision of property.  See Alexander, 
supra note 108, at 1046 -49 (citing Charles Taylor, Leading a Life, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, 
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 170, 178-82 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997)).   
114 See, e.g., STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY?  THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL 
AIRSPACE FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 296 (2008) (“In the end, every country in 
the world settled on the same basic rules.  Everywhere the government was sovereign 
over the airspace, and the property rights of landowners ended where planes flew.”). 
115 For example, the federal Fair Housing Act prohibits both public and private 
actors from discriminating along protected dimensions in providing access to housing.  
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006). 
116 See infra Section IV.C (discussing choices among lumps).   
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A.  Empty and Constructed Lumps 
This Article has emphasized that many property doctrines are de-
scriptively lumpy.  It is a separate question, however, whether the legally 
constructed discontinuities track underlying indivisibilities in con-
sumption or production.  Doctrines that make property law chunky 
may create or entrench a lumpiness that would not otherwise be pre-
sent, or they may sustain a lumpiness that is no longer congruent with 
the way property is produced or consumed.  Where this is the case, we 
should at least consider the possibility of “unchunking” certain aspects 
of property law.117  
It is easy to appreciate the potential costs of such a move, in confu-
sion, complexity, destabilization of expectations, administrative toil, 
and overall hassle.  But there are costs on the other side as well.  
Lumps are not always valuable, or even benign:  not only can they rule 
out choices that some parties value highly, they can also keep society 
from gathering information about preferences for interstitial goods.  
Some doctrinal lumps make societal choices less than optimally sensi-
tive to behavioral inputs, while others can misdirect coercive force.  
Even those who view the current configuration of property rights as 
nearly ideal should be concerned with identifying features of the status 
quo that make property’s lumpy architecture sensible and understand-
ing how changes in empirical conditions would render that configura-
tion less sensible.   
A central problem is that we often lack information about private 
valuations of elements in various property packages, and have little 
idea how that value grows or shrinks as a function of the aggregation 
or disaggregation of entitlements.  One approach would involve find-
ing ways to let owners and nonowners supply credible information on 
the question of complementarity.  Indeed, I have argued elsewhere 
that the law could be involved in providing platforms for eliciting just 
this sort of information.118  Given the degree to which property’s value 
as a social institution depends on getting aggregations right, we should 
 
117 Proposals to “continuize” the law have been advanced in a variety of doctrinal 
areas.  See KATZ, supra note 87, at 145-51.  The unchunking I refer to here bears a family 
resemblance to proposals that attempt to break down doctrinal notches or cliffs in an 
effort to make law more responsive to an underlying continuous variable, such as de-
grees of certainty or culpability.  See id. 
118 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORT L., no. 2, 2011 at 1, 
4 (proposing an option system that would induce low-valuing holders of certain enti-
tlements to self-identify).   
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be interested in finding mechanisms that can improve its performance 
on this dimension.   
We may also wonder to what degree the law itself—and its various 
decisions to entrench, accommodate, or ignore certain concerns—
encourages people to recognize and value certain lumps as lumps.119  
For example, does the legal enforcement of discontinuities at the 
property’s edges entrench a notion of property as an inviolable thing?  
If so, does this entrenchment make property lines more focal for owners 
than they otherwise would be, hardening the parcel-as-lump in ways 
that make larger aggregations more difficult and costly?120  The possi-
bility that law is not merely responding to, but also shaping, the 
chunks in which property delivers utility interestingly complicates 
questions of applying coercion in defense or pursuit of lumps, or of 
choosing between lumps of value. 
B.  Compelling Lumps 
Lumpiness usually goes unnoticed.  We buy tires for our cars in 
sets of four, shoes in sets of two, and complete rather than partial 
houses, all without remarking on the complementarities or indivisibili-
ties involved.  When and why must the law get involved?  
The literature on the production of lumpy public goods offers a 
starting point for answering these questions.121  If we need everyone to 
contribute a bridge segment in order to span a gap, then it becomes 
necessary to coordinate behavior.  Depending on the number of con-
tributors, the number of necessary segments, and the associated indi-
vidual and group payoffs, the collective action problem may take any 
number of forms.122  Such collective action problems are not unique to 
lumpy goods, although the step nature of the bridge does change the 
nature of the strategic interaction.123  The potential sticking point is 
 
119 See, e.g., Steven R. Munzer, A Bundle Theorist Holds On to His Collection of Sticks, 8 
ECON J. WATCH 265, 268-69 (2011) (critiquing Merrill and Smith’s account of property 
as “discrete assets” on the grounds that it “encompasses only valued resources that a 
given legal system and a given community of economic actors already recognize”).   
120 See generally Nash & Stern, supra note 79. 
121 For analyses of the collective action problems surrounding the production of 
lumpy public goods, see HARDIN, supra note 1, at 55-61, and Hampton, supra note 6, 
at 247-250. 
122 See, e.g., Taylor & Ward, supra note 5, at 353-54. 
123 See, e.g., LEVI, supra note 10, at 57 (“[L]umpy goods certainly affect individual 
strategy.”); Hampton, supra note 6, at 259-72 (examining the different strategic interac-
tions associated with step goods and incremental goods).  Public goods with more line-
ar qualities (such as landscaping that may be added to a public thoroughfare in any 
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that many of the benefits of individual contributions will be external-
ized to the rest of the group if the bridge is (within the relevant group) 
nonrival and nonexcludable.124  Public provision is not invariably re-
quired in such cases,125 but the collective action problems associated 
with public goods provide a familiar rationale for coercion.126 
Suppose instead that we have a private party who is ready to con-
struct a toll bridge and who needs only to buy segments from the vari-
ous individuals holding them.  This party may also face a problem that 
requires compulsion.  If all the bridge segments are necessary, unique, 
and unavailable other than from the specific individuals who now hold 
them, there may be a severe holdout problem.  If, instead, there are n 
segment-holders and n – 1 necessary segments, the problem is eased 
considerably.  Indeed, each owner might hurry to avoid being the one 
whose segment is left out of the assembly rather than strive to be the 
last holdout, especially if the bridge segments hold little intrinsic value 
for their owners.127  Thus, compulsion may be unnecessary even when 
goods are lumpy, if there is some degree of competition among input-
 
amount) generate somewhat different collective action problems.  A linear production 
function will often produce a Prisoner’s Dilemma in which each party will prefer not to 
contribute, regardless of what everyone else does.  An exception to this rule applies if 
each person’s contribution generates marginal returns that are so large that the person 
herself is made better off even if nobody else contributes.  See Oliver et al., supra note 
11, at 533-34 (explaining that, depending on the slope, a linear production function 
will induce every player to “contribute either everything possible or nothing”); Fennell, 
supra note 11, at 956 -58 (discussing this point and providing examples that illustrate it). 
124 In other words, if the bridge has the characteristics of a local public good.  See 
RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND 
CLUB GOODS 32-33 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining that local public goods provide nonrival 
and nonexcludable benefits within “a small jurisdiction such as a municipality or a 
town”). 
125 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. L. & ECON. 357, 375 (1974) 
(“The early history [of the British lighthouse system] shows that, contrary to the belief 
of many economists, a lighthouse service can be provided by private enterprise.”).   
126 Coercion might be applied even where the good is not publicly provided; those 
who enjoy the benefits of a particular good might simply be required to reimburse the 
provider.  See generally Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods:  Liability for Unre-
quested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189, 205-09 (2009) (proposing an “expanded duty of 
restitution” that would widen the circumstances in which recipients of benefits must 
compensate the party who has provided them). 
127 Cf. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 64, at 119-24 (presenting an example 
in which a similar dynamic might present normative concerns, given the potential for 
early sales to unravel a community).   
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providers or if the inputs are not strictly complementary.128  This point 
has obvious applications to the exercise of eminent domain.129  
Property lumps might also be compelled by the government to ad-
vance its own production efficiencies or to safeguard consumption 
utility in situations where individuals will have difficulty doing so 
themselves.  Consider first production efficiencies.  If property came 
in just four standard flavors because of the high start-up costs to the 
government of inventing and specifying new forms, post-production 
customization would not be a problem.  It would be no different than 
a Model T owner painting her car yellow after she buys it.130  But if 
there are ongoing costs that the government bears as a continuing 
producer of property law—and these cannot be easily shifted to the 
customizer131—then coercion in the name of cost savings might seem 
justified.  Where private decisions impose public costs, however, a pro-
hibition is only one possibility—and often not the most efficient one. 
We might wonder, for example, whether Pigouvian taxes for prop-
erty customization would be an effective alternative in instances where 
customizations make the property system marginally more difficult to 
administer.132  Pigouvian taxes might work well if customizations merely 
added some degree of incremental strain to a system, as by marginally 
increasing the workload associated with recording and tracking inter-
ests in land.133  But taxes are not likely to be a suitable response if each 
new tweak in property entitlements will require a large, discontinuous 
input (a new full-time worker, say) which will then leave a standing 
supply of excess capacity in treating that particular variation.  If the 
problem is not with new property forms as such, but rather with getting 
 
128 For further exploration of the issues surrounding complementarity, see generally 
Kominers & Weyl, supra note 61. 
129 See supra subsection II.C.1.   
130 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
131 The analog in the private context would be a car manufacturer who voids the 
warranty of any consumer who modifies the vehicle, on the ground that modifications 
raise the costs of keeping the vehicle in running order.    
132 Pigouvian taxes (and subsidies) seek to align private payoffs with social ones by 
internalizing externalities.  See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th 
ed. 1932); see also Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics:  A 
Survey, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 675, 680 (1992) (defining Pigouvian taxes in the pollu-
tion context). 
133 In fact, the system of land recordation in the United States largely privatizes the 
costs of tracking interests in land, as through the work of title insurance companies.  See 
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 87, at 714-15.  The fact that much of the public good of 
keeping titles straight is privately produced does not alter the analysis, though it does 
affect the distributive impact of any externalities that the customizations produce.   
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many people to agree on the same new forms, the law could take the 
lead in offering platforms for coordinating their launch.134 
Similar problems of coordination may exist on the consumption 
utility side of the equation.  Suppose informational externalities pro-
duced by one owner’s isolated act of customization would disrupt an 
entire property system, yet a new property form could be accommo-
dated if it were adopted by a significant segment of the population.135  
If property packages become more valuable for both owners and 
nonowners when many people are consuming the same property 
packages, a lumpy property package may itself produce a second-order 
lumpy good:  a network of consumption patterns that exhibit certain 
kinds of uniformity.  The question then becomes whether and why 
compulsion might be necessary to achieve this public good.   
Setting a property menu might on one account be a pure coordi-
nation game, akin to deciding on which side of the road to drive; no-
body has any independent preference on the matter but only wishes to 
select the same choice as everyone else to avoid a crash.136  In such cases, 
the law can perform an important coordination function by making a 
particular choice focal; enforcement is generally unnecessary because 
it is in everyone’s interest to comply.137  A somewhat different story is 
presented if people have different preferences about what to consume, 
notwithstanding their overriding preference to consume the same 
thing.138  Here, settling on a single package (or a limited set of pack-
ages) will require not just coordination, but also substantive conces-
sions by at least some players.  In the property context, the law’s 
 
134 A small but illustrative analogue can be found in Department of Motor Vehicles 
programs that let customers conditionally commit to purchase a new license plate de-
sign—one that will be produced only if enough others commit to that same design.  See, 
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-725(b)(1) (2005) (requiring 450 prepaid applications for a 
special license plate within thirty days of the plate’s authorization). 
135 This is a hyperbolized version of the account adopted by Merrill and Smith.  See 
Merrill & Smith, supra note 41, at 47 (“The one out of one hundred who adopts a non-
standard form for property rights can increase the costs of processing the rights of 
ninety-nine others.”); id. at 40 (observing that the numerus clausus principle does allow 
new property forms to be legislatively created, and thus “permits some positive level of 
diversification in the recognized forms of property”). 
136 See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1649, 1667 (2000).  
137 See id. at 1667-68. 
138 The game theoretic paradigm for this situation is “The Battle of the Sexes” (now 
often renamed “Bach or Stravinsky”), in which a couple has an overriding desire to 
spend an evening out together, but each member of the couple has a different pre-
ferred form of entertainment.  See, e.g., id. at 1672-74, 1673 n.56. 
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insistence on a limited menu might operate like an in-kind tax system 
that compels each person to contribute their “frustration costs”139 to 
the larger good of uniformity.   
A further inquiry is whether this uniformity is worth the cost of 
these compelled inputs—and, even if it is, whether we could achieve it 
at a lower frustration price by recalibrating the menu to include dif-
ferent, or additional, entries.  These questions bring us back to the 
problems of demand revelation that plague the provision of public 
goods.  The Tiebout hypothesis famously posits that jurisdictional varia-
tion can elicit information about the public goods and services that var-
ious households desire.140  To the extent that some of the benefits of 
uniformity can be achieved at a relatively small scale, Tiebout’s insight 
may have interesting implications.  For example, if social or political 
benefits were thought to flow from everyone in a given neighborhood or 
private community holding the same tenure form, local variation capa-
ble of inducing localized sorting could achieve small-scale uniformity 
without requiring a fixed tenure menu at the state level.141 
C.  Choosing Lumps 
I have already emphasized that property law must often choose be-
tween competing assemblages.  I offer here a few brief thoughts on 
how the task might be approached.  Most fundamentally, choosing 
among competing chunks requires knowing which sets of entitlements 
stack together in a highly complementary way, and which do not.  In 
other words, it requires knowing something about the relevant pro-
duction functions.  Sometimes the degree of complementarity simply 
informs or explains how a single owner of the relevant inputs chooses 
between possible ways of aggregating those inputs.  For example, if 
bridges are built by a governmental entity that has only a certain num-
ber of linear feet of bridge material, we will understand why it chooses 
 
139 Merrill & Smith, supra note 41, at 35-38. 
140 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956). 
141 Cf. Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law:  Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 905-27 (2007) (making an analogous argument for local varia-
tion in  levels of property protection).  The example in the text brackets many im-
portant normative and empirical questions, including the possibility that sorting along 
tenure lines could impede other valuable aggregations, such as the production of 
desirable housing patterns across income lines.  
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to allocate those linear feet to the production of complete rather than 
partial bridges (and we will have cause to complain if it fails to do so). 
If different parties own the necessary inputs, however, they must 
be convinced—or coerced—to contribute them to valuable aggrega-
tions.  Where strict complementarity is present, the strategic holdout 
problem may be so severe as to make some form of coercion unavoid-
able.  The use of coercion to create a valuable assembly, however, always 
entails uncertainty about the private valuations of the separate inputs, 
and thus presents the possibility that the assembly does not generate 
surplus after all.  I will not revisit here the various mechanisms that 
have been discussed in the literature for eliciting better valuation in-
formation from owners.  One component of the valuation story, how-
ever, deserves independent attention:  private valuations may exceed 
market values as a result of other, identifiable aggregations. 
Consider a land assembly that would break up a neighborhood, or 
one that would interrupt a lengthy period of possession for one or 
more occupants.  If most people value possession of a home in a fairly 
linear way, enjoying a steady stream of benefits each year regardless of 
whether the total number of years is few or many, then ending posses-
sion abruptly will not cause disproportionate harm.  Likewise, if the 
social benefits in a neighborhood are accrued block by block in a 
modular manner that does not depend on the existence of neighbor-
ing blocks, then carving away part of the neighborhood (as long as 
blocks are left intact) will do little harm.  If, however, the production 
functions take different forms, the problem becomes a complicated 
one in which the value added by a coercive spatial aggregation must be 
compared with the surplus that will be lost by coercively breaking up 
other aggregations.142  Even small changes in assumptions about com-
plementarity can make large differences.  For example, if we soften 
the assumption of strict complementarity for the spatial aggregation—
suppose the project will deliver most of its value if eighty percent of 
the available pieces are supplied—then the nature of the collective 
action problem changes dramatically and, potentially, so does the 
need for coercion. 
Although normative judgments are an unavoidable part of choos-
ing between lumps, empirical judgments about valuations are central  
 
 
 
142 For further exploration of community aggregations as they relate to eminent 
domain, see Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 66, at 113-24, 133-42.    
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to the inquiry as well.  Finding mechanisms for collecting information 
about the likely shape of the production functions at issue should be 
an important focus for empirical work.143  We must also confront the 
possibility that the law itself may influence how various aggregations 
are valued, and the related potential that legal changes could reshape 
those valuations.144 
CONCLUSION 
Legal theory has paid insufficient attention to the role of lumpy or 
discontinuous production functions.  This omission is particularly 
striking in the field of property, given the institution’s doctrinal and 
conceptual focus on “things” as indivisible repositories of value.  This 
Article has sketched how lumpiness matters for property law, and has 
considered some of the doctrinal and theoretical implications of ex-
plicitly recognizing this aspect of property’s architecture.  It has also 
raised questions about the mutability and desirability of lumpy think-
ing in property law and theory. 
A particular concern is whether some aspects of property’s lumpi-
ness are historical artifacts that no longer correspond to what is cur-
rently most valuable about the institution.  Leaving lumps alone is not 
costless, especially where the chunks that make up individual property 
holdings conflict with other aggregations that society may wish to un-
dertake on a broader scale.  Indeed, some of property’s most important 
conflicts can be most usefully framed in terms of competing lumps.  
Explicitly framing things in this way makes clear that the question is not 
so much whether property will be lumpy, but rather how it will be lumpy. 
 
143 For example, Stephanie Stern has recently noted the relative dearth of psycho-
logical evidence indicating that people who are displaced from their homes suffer a 
dire and lasting welfare loss—a finding contrary to the strong assumptions that have 
been employed by many legal scholars and social commentators.  Stephanie M. Stern, 
Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1109-19 
(2009).   
144 Jonathan Nash and Stephanie Stern have empirically investigated the degree to 
which the framing of ownership as bundles or as “discrete assets” influences attitudes 
toward entitlements.  Nash & Stern, supra note 79.  They have suggested that the law 
might consciously craft property conceptualizations to modulate the strength of owner-
ship claims.  Id. at 453-55; cf. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:  Dividing a 
Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1102 (1995) (positing 
that endowment effects might be weaker in a liability rule regime); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski 
& Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1572-
74 (1998) (discussing experimental results on the influence of the available legal rem-
edy on the endowment effect). 
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I must leave to future work a fuller explication of these points, as 
well as a broader look at the significance of lumpiness for law across 
other doctrinal areas.  I hope, however, that the chunk of analysis that 
I have taken on here forms a useful lump. 
